By Abdulbasit Kassim The President Muhammad Buhari administration has advanced the narrative of “technically defeating,” “tactically d...
By Abdulbasit Kassim
The President Muhammad Buhari administration has advanced the narrative of
“technically defeating,” “tactically defeating,” and “completely defeating”
Boko Haram. As much as I will not necessarily want to tag the Buhari’s Boko Haram
“success” as a myth, the “success narrative” has been blown out of proportion.
The decline of Boko Haram’s strength is not necessarily the result of
proactive steps of the new administration or even the relocation of the command
center to Maiduguri. Although the present administration would want to claim
victory over Boko Haram for the recovery of territories previously annexed by
the group, the fratricidal wars that started from the time of the Nigerian
Taliban and the series of endogenous schisms that plagued the group did more
damage than the salvos of the government.
Even before the public disclosure of the mutual recrimination between
the Abubakar Shekau/Man Chari and Abu Mus`ab al-Barnawi/Mamman Nur factions,
Boko Haram was clearly heading towards a natural death on account of the
group’s tactical disagreements over takfir (excommunication of Muslims) and the
killing of Muslims; strategic disagreements between the group’s pragmatists and
doctrinarians; rifts with al-Qaeda affiliates in the Islamic Maghreb; tense
relations with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; dissent over goals and views
of the enemy; ideological competition with other Muslim actors; and a dwindling
support base of fighters who are constantly befuddled by the faction to support
at each epoch of the group’s schisms.
This piece only gives a broad overview of the internal debates and
fratricidal wars plaguing Boko Haram. An in-depth examination of this issue can
be found in my article titled “Boko Haram’s Internal Civil War: Stealth Takfir
and Jihad as Recipes for Schism,” which will be published on March 15, 2018 as
part of a volume titled, Boko Haram
Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Conflict.
The first schism evolved from the debate on the appropriate time to
declare jihad and the necessity of establishing Islamic evidence (Iqāmat
al-dalīl/al-ḥujja) on political rulers ruling with secular laws, and it took
place between Muhammad Yusuf and Abu Abdurrahman Muhammad Ali al-Barnawi during
the formative period of the Nigerian Taliban. Yusuf reasoned that by
establishing Islamic evidence on the political rulers ruling with secular laws,
it would attract a large followership and support communities that would be
ideologically immune to the arguments put forth by the Salafi clerics in their
defense of the political rulers.
These communities would then be better indoctrinated to fight jihad
against the secular rulers. On the other hand, Ali argued that it is not
obligatory to establish the Islamic evidence on the political rulers before
declaring jihad against them because none of them can claim to be ignorant of
God’s command to rule with His laws as opposed to secular laws.
The second schism took place between the followers of Abu Usama
al-Ansari (Auwal Ibrahim Gombe) who later launched Ansaru in 2012 and the
followers of Abubakar Shekau. The schisms covered the debate on the
counter-productive strategy of targeting Muslim civilians especially those who
participate in elections, Shekau’s uncompromising stance on al-`udhr bi-l-jahl (excuse of
ignorance), Shekau’s excommunication of Muslims, Shekau’s demand for obligatory
obedience, his refusal to permit his followers to travel to Somalia and Algeria
without his permission, and his complete rejection of the group’s Consultative
Council.
Even the mediation from Abu Hasan Rashid al-Bulaydi and Abu Abdalla
al-Shinqiti of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb could not bring the two factions
together. The first and second epoch of schisms did not claim many casualties
within the group unlike the third epoch, which reached its peak during the
current administration.
The third epoch of schism witnessed the killing of top commanders in the
group, most of whom were killed for petty reasons or for insubordination. For
example, Taasi'u 'Abu Zinira' who was
involved in the negotiation for Chibok girls was killed by Shekau; Mallam
Abdulmalik, BH leader in Kaduna, was also killed; Abu Amr Falluja and Ba Gomna
(a relative of Shekau) were killed (the latter was killed because he bought a
house at Amchide in Cameroon); Mustapha Chad who was sanctioned by the US
Treasury was killed; Kaka Allai who allegedly led the Monguno Barracks attack
in 2013 was killed; Abu RPG was killed for backbiting; Abdullahi Hudu was
killed for narrating a dream where Muhammad Yusuf told him to speak to Shekau
to refrain from slave raiding; Adam Vitiri and many others too numerous to
mention were all victims of the in-group fratricide.
This fratricide is akin to having a government that kills off all its
major army generals. But the killings did not end there. In addition to the
killings, they also leaked each other’s' secrets. The ideological friction
leading to infighting and bloodshed between Abubakar Shekau and Abu Mus`ab
al-Barnawi are informed by the following:
Both factions view political rulers, soldiers of the Nigerian Army, and
members of the Civilian JTF as infidels. But Nur and Abu Mus`ab al-Barnawi do
not excommunicate Muslims who do not view the actors above as infidels as long
as they do not provide active and passive support for those actors in their war
against Boko Haram. They excuse the Muslims until the “actions of unbelief” of
the actors above have been clearly explained to Muslims.
According to Shekau’s interpretation, Nur and Abu Mus`ab al-Barnawi have
also become infidels based on their position. The excommunication of Nur and
Abu Mus`ab al-Barnawi is lawful in Shekau’s view based on the permissibility of
‘Takfīr al-Adhir’ (making takfīr on
the one who gives the excuse of ignorance on an individual engaging in acts of
polytheism). Therefore, it is
permissible to shed the blood of Nur and Abu Mus`ab al-Barnawi and those who
follow them in ISWAP. It is also permissible to shed the blood of anyone who
doubts the permissibility of killing Nur, Abu Mus`ab al-Barnawi, and their
followers in ISWAP.
So Boko Haram has been weakened not only by government
counterterrorism operations but also by their own squabbles and internal disputes.
In view of these internal and potentially endless disputes, even without the
salvos of the government, the group is eventually heading towards a natural
death, but the course of the death changed with the dynamics that came with the
payment of ransom for the release of the captives kidnapped by both factions of
the group.
The extent to which the payment of ransom will alter the group’s
operations is yet to be seen, but for the foreseeable future the internal civil
war is nowhere near over. Our situation would have been worse today if not for the
fratricide that wrecked the group to an unimaginable position.
Related Article:
Bursting the Myth of Buhari's Boko Haram "Success"
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